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21 Day's Conn. tep.
Accompice.-Where D, an accomplice, having testified on the trial
before the petit jury, witnesses were called to prove circumstances tending
to corroborate the testimony of D; it was held, that the evidence of such
witnesses was admissible. The State vs. Wolcott and others.
Administrator.-It is the duty of an administrator, in selling estate of
the deceased, by order of the Court of Probate, to sell for ready money;
and if he neglect to do so, and sell on the personal security of the pur-
chaser, it is a breach of duty, for which, if a loss ensues, he is liable on his
bond to the Court of Probate. And in such case, his having acted pru-
dently and in good faith, will not exonerate him from liability. Foster
vs. Thomas and another.
Amendment.-Where the original declaration was in covenant for rent
on an indenture between S and W, setting forth the indenture as the
ground of action, and averring an assignment ,of it to the plaintiff with
notice, and assigning a breach; during the pentlency of the action, the
plaintiff offered a new count as an amendment, setting forth more specially
the manner of the assignment to the plaintiff, showing how he became
assignee, not of the lease merely, but of the reversionary interest; which
amendment being allowed, it was held, that this was not erroneous, as
changing the form or ground of the action. Baldwin vs. Walker.
Arrest of Judgment.-Th a motion in arrest of judgment, for the mis-
conduct of one of the jurors, it appeared, that during the progress of the
trial, just ibefore the assembling of the Court, after an adjournment at
noon, a map or diagram of the pond and of the stream issuing therefrom,
with the dam and flume at the outlet, constructed by engineers employed
by both parties, and previously used before the jury, was lying upon the
bar table; and one of the jurors coming in, took it up, and while he was
examining it, T, one of the witnesees who had testified in the cause, and
one of the mill-owners on said stream below the plaintiff, and of course,
interested in the question, took hold of the map and. turned it around,
saying to the juror, that he would understand it better if it was turned
around, and then pointed to certain localities marked upon it. The inter-
view between T and the juror continued, in a low voice, for two or three
minutes, in the presence, but not within the hearing of the sheriff, clerk
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and some of the members of the bar. T testified that he did not know
that the juror was one ; and the juror testified that what was said and
done had no effect upon his mind, and no influence upon the verdict.
Held, with some hesitation, that the verdict ought not to be disturbed.
Hickox and anotr vs. Parmelee and another.
Sttorne .- An atiorney, employed to commence and prosecute a suit,
but not otherwise authorized, has no power to settle that suit, and discharge
the defendant from the plaintiff's'claim. Dertort and wife vs. L omer.
Charge to tle Jury.-Where the defence to an action on note was, that
when the note was given by A, he was blind, and could not read it; that
he was then tinder arrest and held in custody, on a criminal prosecution;
and that, in that condition, he was overcome by threats, and was not a
free and voluntary agent in giving the note. In view of all the evidence
upon the point, the Court charged the jury, that the threats in question, in
order to avoid the note, must have been such as would intimidate a man
of ordinary firmness; adding, that if A had mind enough fairly and fully
to comprehend the cause and object of the note, and the nature and extent
of it, and if he acted as a free and voluntary agent in executing it, it
would be good,-otherwise, it would be absolutely void; after a verdict
for the plaintiff, it was held, that the charge was unexceptionable. Wal-
bridge vs. Arnold and another.
Where a further defence to such action was, that the note was given
under the pressure of a criminal prosecution, and to induce a suppression
of it; which was denied by the plaintiff, who claimed that the pendency
of the criminal process had no influence, and was not intended to have
any, in procuring the note; and the Court charged the jury, th'at if the
note was given freely, to satisfy the plaintiff's private claim for damages,
it was good; but void, if it was given, in whole or in part, to suppress an
inquiry into the commis~ioi of an offence, or to prevent, in any measure,
the administration of criminal justice; it was held, that the bharge was
not erroneolas. ,16.
The Court, in its charge to the jury, is not bound to state the law
arising upon abstract questions. Cowles, ex 'r of Cowles vs. Bacon.
Where the Court, in an action for an injury sustained by the plaintiff,
in a stage-coach, instructed the jury, that if the defendant owned the
horses', in the absence of all evidence to the contrary, it was reasonable to
presume that the driver having the control of them, was placed ina that
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situation by the defendant's consent, and that they were employed in his
business; but that the contrary might be shown; submitting the question
to them as one of fact for them to decide; it was held, that the charge
was unexceptionable. Haight and wife vs. Turner and others.
Declaration.-Where the declaration, in an action against a railroad
corporation, for a personal injury to one of the plaintiffs, after stating
that the defendants were the owners of a certain railroad, running through
the towns of W and P, and of certain cars for the conveyance of passen-
gers upon that road, averred, that on the day specified, the defendants
were the owners of, and were running and propelling upon said road, a
certain train of passenger cars, for a certain reasonable reward paid to the
defendants; it was held, that it sufficiently appeared from the declaration,
that the defendants were common carriers. Fuller and wife vs. Nrauga-
tuck Railroad Company.
Where the declaration, by husband and wife, for a personal injury to
the wife, after stating the nature and extent. of the injury complained of,
proceeded to allege, that by means of such injury, she became sick, and
was prevented from attending to her necessary affairs, and that the plain-
tiffs were thereby forced to, and did, necessarily expend two hundred
dollars in endeavoring to effect a cure; it was held, that although the
plaintiffs could not recover, in the same action, for the wife's personal
injury, and also for the expenses of her cure, yet in this case, the ground
of damages, was the wife's personal injury alone, and the statement
regarding the expenses of her cure, was to be considered as descriptive of
the extent of her injury, and not as a distinct and substantive ground of
damages, and in that aspect, though unnecessary, still it was very proper;
but if otherwise, yet as the gist of the action was the breach of contract
in not carrying the wife safely, and this was a ground on which- the plain-
tiffs could recover, it will be presumed, after verdict, that the Court con-
fined the evidence to that ground. Ibid.
Where in one count of the declaration in such action, the promise was
alleged as made to the wife, and in another, as made to the plaintiffs; but
in the latter case, the allegation of the promise was preceded and followed
by language, which showed *that the promise was made for the wife's
benefit; it was held, that the fair reading of this count was, that the
promise was made to her; and consequently there was no misjoinder of
counts. 1b.
E idence.-Where a partyoffered in evidence an entryin a shop book, unac-
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companied by the testimony of the clerk who made the entry, though he was
living, and in the immediate vicinity, and no reason for his absence
appeared; it was held, the evidence offered was inadmissible. Stiles and
others vs. Homer and others,
Foreign .Attachment.-Where it appeared on a scire facia8 in a pro-
cess of foreign attachment, that the defendant was indebted to F, the
absconding debtor, by a promissory note, payable to F, or order, on de-
mand, with interest, aqd secured by mortgage; that F, while the holder
of such note, demanded payment of the maker, several times, which he
failed to make, after which this process was commenced; and that subse-
quently, on the same day, and twenty-one days after the making of the
note, F, for a full and valuable consideration, indorsed it to G, who had
notice of the service of process on the defendant; it was held-st. That
the note had become due, and of course was over-due when it was indorsed
to G. 2d. That being so over-due, the transfer of it did not vacate the
plaintiff's lien. 3d. That the circumstance that the, note was collaterally
secued by mortgage, did not vary the case in favor of the defendant. 4th
That though the equities to which a n~egotiable note, negotiated after due,
is subject, are limited to such as attach to the note itself, and not to claims
arising out of collateral matters, yet this doctrine is not applicable to the
attachment of such note, by process of foreign attachment; the only case'
excepted from the operation of this process being where the note is nego-
tiated before it becomes payable. Oulver vs. -Parish.
Husband and wyfe.-A promise founded on a consideration relating to
the wife's personal security, does not vest absolutely in the husband, but
may be the subject of an action in the name of husband and wife, Fuller
and wife vs. Naugatuck Railroad Company.
In all cases where the cause of action will survive to the wife, she may
join with her husband in a suit upon it. ibid.
Insurance.-It was provided in one of the conditions of insurance
annexed to the policy, that the survey and description of the property
should be deemed a part of such policy, and a warranty. The survey con-
sisted of interrogatories and answers. One of the interrogatories was: li Is
there a watchman in the mill, during the might 7" To which the answer
was: "There is a watchman, nights." The property insured was destroyed
by fire on the night following the setting of the sun on Saturday, and the
fire was first discovered on the morning.of Sunday, while it was yet dark;
during which period, there was no watchman in the mill. Held, that the
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survey contained a clear engagement by the insured, that they would
keep a watchman in their mill through the hours of every night in the
week; which engagement being broken, there could be no recovery on the
policy. Te Glendale Woollen Company vs. The Protection Insurance
Company.
Where the charter of a mutual insurance company, whereof the insured
are members, provided, that no insurance effected on any property should
be good and valid to the insured, unless he had a good and perfect unin-
cumbered title thereto, at the time of effecting such insurance; and in an
action on a policy issued under such charter, it appeared, that at the time
it was effected, there was outstanding, a title to the property insured, in a
third person, by virtue of a mortgage of that property to him, previously
executed, and never released; it was held, that the insured had not "a
good and unincumbered title," within the meaning of the charter, and
consequently, was precluded from a recovery. Warner vs. Middlesex*
Mutual Insurance Company.
A.perfect title imports one that is good, both in law and in equity. Ibid.
Juror.-It is now fully settled, that the testimony of a juror cannot be
received for the purpose of setting aside a verdict, on the ground of mistake
or misconduct of the jury. Haight and wife vs. Turner and others.
Malicious Prosecqtion.-In an action for a malicious prosecution, the
evidence introduced on the trial of that prosecution is admissible, for the
purpose of showing reasonable and probable cause. And such evidence
may be proved by any competent witness. Goodrich vs. Warner.
Nuisance.-The trade and occupation of carriage-making or of a black-
smith is a lawful and useful one; and a building erected for its exercise, is
not a nuisance per se. But if such building, though erected on the builder's
own land, and occupied in the usual manner, be in an improper place,
where its use will probably result in an injury to another, this is, of itself,
a i.rongful act, for which the -wrong-doer is responsible to one essentially
injured thereby. Whitney vs. Bartholomew.
Therefore, where the plaintiff was the owner of a dwelling-house and
land; and the defendant was in the occupation of a lot of land adjoining
the plaintiff's land, upon which was a large carriage factory and a black-
smith's shop having several chimneys; and the shop and chimneys were
placed upon or very near the dividing line of the lands of the parties; and
in consequence of the location and use of the blacksmith's shop, the cinders,
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ashes and smoke issuing therefrom, were thrown, in large quantities, upon
the plaintiff's house and land, rendering the water unfit for use, and the
house nearly untenantable; it was held, that the defendant was liable for
such injury. Ibid.
Partnership.-The debts of a partnership are in equity joint and several;
and a person having a debt against a partnership, may, on the death of
one of the partners, come immediately against the estate of that partner,
and have his claim allowed, by the commissioners, pan passu with private
claims, though the surviving partner be solvent and within the jurisdiction
of our Courts. Camp vs. Grant and others, administrators.
Though the creditors of a partnership are entitled to a priority of pay-
ment, as between them and creditors of an individual partner, out of the
partnership funds, so long as they continue partnership funds; yet they
have no specific lien thereon; and while the partnership remains and its
business is going on, whether it be in fact solvent or not, there is no legal
objection to a bona fide distribution of the partnership fund among the
members of the firm, or a bonafide change of them from joint to separate
estate. Allen and another vs. The Centre Valley Company and others.
_Principal and Agent.-A note signed by the authorized agents of a
'corporation, with words annexed to their names intimating their agency,
is the note of the corporation, and-not of the persons signing it. Johnson
vs. Smith and others.
Though a person duly authorized as agent, and acting as such, may bind
himself personally; yet this must be done by language clearly expressive
of such an intent. bid.
So also, a person signing as agent, may bind himself, if he had no
authority to bind, and has not bound his principal. Ibid.
In case of a defective power to bind the principal, if the agent speaks
only in the language of the principal, and does not use apt language to
bind himself, he will not be liable on the contract, but may be subjected
for a false assumption of authority. Ibid.
R ease.-Where A recovered a judgment against the partnership of B
& C, for more than. 700 dollars, after which the parties met in the State of
New York, where the debt was originally contracted, and made a compro-
mise of such debt; whereupon A gave to B a writing, certifying that A
had received 300 dollars from B, in consideration of which, A released B
from all claims against him individually, and also as one of the firm of B
& C; to an action afterwards br6ught in this State, by A against B, as
ABSTRACTS OF RECENT AMERICAN CASES.
surviing partner of B & C, to recover said judgment debt, B pleaded such
release at the bar; it was held, first, that this being a New York transaction,
must be governed by the law of that State; second, that under such law,
the release pleaded was effectual to bar the action; third, that though B
was discharged from liability in every form, the estate of C remained
liable. Beam and another vs. Barnum.
Trust.-It is a well established principle of equity, that to raise a trust
it must be ascertained what proportion each beneficiary is to take. Harper
and wife vs. Phelps and wife.
Nor will a Court of Equity raise a trust from expressions importing
recommendation, hope, confidence, desire, &c., where the objects of the
trust are not certain and definite; or where the property, which is to be
the subject of the trust, is not certain and definite; or where a clear choice
to act, or not to act, is given; or where the prior disposition import an
absolute and uncontrollable ownership. id.
WilL.-Though, for some purposes, a will is considered as speaking from
its execution, the time of its inception, and for others, from the death of
the testator, the time of its consummation; yet the general rtale is, that it
speaks from the death of the testator, where there is nothing in its lan-
guage indicating a different iitention. Gold and wife vs. Judson and
others.
Parol evidence is not admissible to vary the construction of a will, where
there is no ambiguity created by the application of extraneous circum-
stances. Canfield vs. Bostwick and others.
Abstracts in the Court of Appeals of South Carolina, in Chancery.
A marriage solemnized in South Carolina is indissoluble, either by the
consent of the parties, or by the judgment of any foreign tribunal, or
statute of any foreign legislature.
No judicial tribunal in South Carolina has any authority to declare a
divorce; and no divorce has ever been granted by the Legislature of the
State.
Nothing but the actual or presumed death of one of the parties can have
the effect of discharging the obligations and legal effects of the marriage
contract. Thomas G. Duke vs. John A. Fulmer and others.
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The Stat. 22 & 23 Car. 3, c. 10 (made of force in South Carolina), and
the Act of Assembly of 1789, are to be construed together. Before grant-
ing letters of administration on the estate-of an intestate, the Ordinary is
required to take from the party applicant "a sufficient bond with two or
more able sureties, respect being had to the value of the estate." Held,
that each of the securities thus required must be of sufficient, pecuniary
ability to nake good the bond.
The omission of the Ordinary to take two good and sufficient sureties
to an administration bond, by which loss accrues to the parties interested
in the estate, is an official default for which an Ordinary is liable, if it
result from negligence or want of due diligence, although it may not
amount to corruption or willful default.
When the sureties are proved to have been, in fact, insufficient when
the bond was taken, the burthen is then upon the Ordinary to show that
his having taken such surety was owing to no negligence or want of due
diligence on his part.
In this case the value of the personal estate was about five thousand
dollars; and a bond, with two sureties in the penalty of ten thousand
dollars, was taken by the Ordinary. The estate was squandered by the
administrator; and the sureties were proved to have been insufficient at
the date of the bond. Held, that under the circumstances of the case, the
Ordinary was liable to the distributees, although sevehal witnesses testified
that they would have been willing at the same time to have taken a bond
of that amount with the same sureties.
The law looks to the pecuniary ability or sufficiency of the sureties
rather than of the administrator, inasmuch as the Ordinary, in granting
administration, is required to regard propinquity of blood, &c., without
reference to the solvency of the applicant. Duncan McRae and others vs.
Joshua David, Ordintry qf Marlborough District.
